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COMM UNISM AND RELIGION - Telling the story for the 21st Century  
By Mark Pargeter  
Mark Pargeter, MA, MCIM is Company Secretary, Keston 
Institute, Oxford. As corrective and update to our reporting 
on changes at Keston, he contributed the following 
paper.In addition, according to Pargeter’s reports in 
Frontier (Summer 2003) Keston has established a formal 
partnership with Regent’s Park College in Oxford. The 
newly appointed Director of Keston, Dr. Davor Peterlin of 
Zagreb, Croatia, is also Research Fellow at Regent’s.  
Points of revolution and change in political affairs almost always bring with them 
changes in religious perspectives. A crucial feature of the Peace of Westphalia which 
ended the Thirty Years War in 1648 was a revision of religious perspective which led to a 
unique feature of religious community in Alsace, that of shared churches between 
Catholics and Protestants which remains to this day.  
Although we are too close to the events which followed the break-up of Communist 
totalitarianism in Russia and Eastern Europe, we can see religious perspectives emerging 
which may over time be as influential, and if undocumented will remain as unremarked 
as the shared churches of Alsace. Yet the cohabitation of the Catholic and Protestant 
churches in Europe has been influential within the whole of Western European 
civilization and has had an effect on geopolitics. Similarly the experience of enforced 
atheism may be seen to have had an equally influential effect on the future course of 
history.  
In this the documentary evidence of religious life, and its maturity under a rampant 
atheism is a pivotal area of academic study. For many of the middle years of the 
twentieth century university syllabuses in politics, and a great deal of theological 
discourse was influenced by the experience of Communism. There were many who 
believed that it was possible for Communism to cohabit with Christianity, and other 
world religions despite or 
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perhaps because of its avowed atheism. It was intended to sharpen faith and to 
point to the social and economic ills of civilization, showing how the theoretical tenets of 
Communism were compatible with the development of the Christian Gospel. Some of the 
theological perspectives which emerged centered in the death of God controversy and 
Liberation theology. These matters were all hotly debated by groups which included 
representatives from both sides of the Iron Curtain, and some of the discussions took 
place in Eastern Europe. This gave the illusion of cohabitation while ordinary religious 
people were subjected in some Communist countries to civic disabilities, active 
persecution, the confiscation of property and exile. For many adherence to a faith was a 
death sentence. Albania was alone among the countries of the Eastern bloc to outlaw 
religion altogether, but they all shared the conviction that even if superficially tolerated, 
religious practice, when denied economic foundations, would wither away.  
What was ignored in this discourse were the unintended consequences of a social 
system which in its zeal for reform disregarded the hopes and aspirations of the people it 
set out to prosper. A natural desire within the human spirit to test the power of authority 
led to an underground movement, and shaped the way in which many art forms and 
literary genres developed. Modern serial music, in particular, was given a boost by being 
against the Communist establishment, and constituted a ‘safer’ form of expression 
because it was nonverbal. Even so, Estonia’s greatest living composer, Part, was forced 
into exile, and Shostakovich regularly came under suspicion for so-called modernism. It 
might be noted that performances of Bach and Handel in Communist regimes were rare, 
and that when played the Christian references in Bach were almost always replaced 
simply by the catalogue numbers. This deliberate destruction of the cultural tradition has 
led to a revival of interest in the very things the regimes sought to overthrow in the post-
Communist period. 
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The time has come to explore the documents and to analyze the thoughts and 
beliefs of those who lived through this period of state atheism. At Keston Institute in 
Oxford there lies an archive of materials from this period which needs to be shared with 
scholars and with the ordinary public to show how the religious spirit can survive 
constant attack, not only from those who imposed state atheism but from well-wishers of 
Communism who were sure that cohabitation was possible.  
During the 1970s and 80s Keston Institute was occupied in receiving documents 
from Communist bloc countries and making information available from that 
documentation. It has never been a campaigning organization in the way that Amnesty 
International was set up to be, and has relied constantly on letting the testimonies, the 
documents, the pictures, speak for themselves.  
Now is the time to analyze this material and to interpret it for the future. Keston 
Institute intends to begin a long-term project that will make available some of this 
material in a way that will both interpret and invite further discussion. It will consist of 
copies of original self-published (samizdat) religious poetry, testimonies and defence 
testimony from court cases from the Brezhnev years with translations, photographs, audio 
tapes and contemporary newspaper and journal reports. In some cases material direct 
from the KGB archives which relates to the materials delivered to Keston from those who 
were suffering persecution will be added together with contemporary commentaries. 
There will be comments from religious leaders both East and West as they appeared at 
the time.  
Together these materials will offer a challenge to those who study it. Keston 
Institute has never campaigned but it has always challenged and encouraged those who 
read its materials to use them. This will continue as those who read the histories and 
study the documents say – never again. But we believe that not only does it say 
something about 
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Communism, and about its reaction with the capitalist west, it says more about the 
soul of people everywhere. It has something timeless to say about the indomitable human 
spirit which refuses to lie down under dictatorship and totalitarian regimes. It provides a 
window on that spirit as it attempts to provide answers to questions such as – Why are we 
here? Is there a purpose in life?  
We at Keston Institute believe that the story of the Communist years relating to the 
religious yearnings of believers is an important element in the understanding of that 
human spirit, and that it is not a story which closed with the fall of the Berlin Wall and 
the collapse of Communism. Communism has left its legacies across the world that it 
dominated and there are still countries in which the laws passed in the Communist era are 
part of the current constitutional basis of society. There are persons who maintain power 
who are comfortable with the old methods, and use the methods of control that they were 
brought up with.  
Furthermore we can assemble groups of witnesses to the story of religion under 
Communism not only from those who were oppressed but among those who were present 
at the consultations and conferences which spread the Marxist message through 
involvement in the Peace Movement, and other ‘Communist front’ organisations. These 
witnesses are drawn from those now retired from the organizations in which they served 
but who are vital to an understanding of faith history, and so indirectly to a deeper 
understanding of humanity.  
Keston Institute is therefore to embark on this program as a matter of urgency. Its 
aims are simply to ensure that the importance of religion in the life of nations in 
extremely hostile conditions is documented in as complete a way as possible, by word, 
written and spoken, moving and fixed image, and by memoir and discussion from those 
who were present at the time. This material can be placed in context which will include 
discussions of the economic and political background against which the religious life was 
played out, and in a rigorous 
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sociological and psychological investigation of what effects this manipulation of 
the human spirit has had on those who were willing or unwilling participants.  
It is not to be forgotten that the process of indoctrination into the Communist 
system was begun with children when they first attended their local schools and 
continued through to the highest levels of the educational hierarchy. We need to 
investigate whether this system of education was in fact an encouragement to eventual 
disbelief in the promotion of state atheism and contained within it the seeds of its own 
downfall. If this is so then we may discuss whether a system which contains no measure 
of indoctrination is a better vehicle for the destruction of religious belief. Within this 
material there are inevitably parallels and discussion points which concern the post 
Communist world and the structure of society in Western Europe today. But these will 
inevitably emerge from the material. It is not our business to present our material as a 
vehicle of indoctrination in its own right.  
Time is short. There has been a decent interval since the collapse of Communism in 
the West, an interval in which it has been possible to see the result of this collapse over a 
decade. But at the same time many of the voices from that era are beginning to be 
silenced through death and by the inevitable destruction and deterioration of documentary 
sources. There is also the question of denial among those most actively involved in the 
promotion of state atheism and among those who dealt with the hierarchies of state 
churches under Communism.  
The Rev. Dr Michael Bourdeaux, founder of the Keston Institute has already 
trawled the archive at the Institute for numerous obituaries of those who have already 
passed on from that age. We are anxious that the living word of those who remain should 
be available to be passed on to future generations rather than simply a eulogy to an 
outstanding voice. It is all too easy for an obituarist, however well intentioned, to be 
selective in his story, even more 
 
RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE XXIII, 6 (December 2003) page 54.  
for the text editor of the journal in which it appears to cut perhaps something which 
the  
subject when alive would have regarded as crucial.  
The work of Keston Institute has been of a piece in preparing the ground for this 
new  
and exciting development in its activities.  
1. 1. It has preserved the archive from the period which marks a particular but 
perhaps arbitrary era within the Communist period on which it has daily news clippings, 
extensive written testimonies and photographic evidence.  
2. 2. Its library covers the whole period of Communism in the Soviet Union and 
Western Europe.  
3. 3. In the post-Communist period it has extensive documentation of continuing 
abuse of power relating to religion, and has examined as an example the extent of 
religious belief in the whole of Russia.  
4. 4. It has some material and a watching brief on areas which continue to embrace 
Communism, through adherence to a totalitarian form of government.  
5. 5. Its Moscow staff are beginning the crucial task of examining some of the 
provincial archives in Russia which are in danger of destruction on religious affairs in the 
Communist period.  
 
We are fortunate that much of the material for this presentation is available to us in  
Oxford. However, resources are urgently needed to make this material accessible to a 
new  
generation for whom the Communist period is already history. 
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BOOK REVIEW:  
Serhii Plokhy and Frank E. Sysyn, Religion and Nation in Modern Ukraine. Edmonton 
and  
Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2003. 216 pp. $39.95  
(cloth); $27.95 (paper). – Reviewed by James R. Payton, Jr.  
Within the last generation, the topics of nation and religion have forced 
themselves back into scholarly consideration of Eastern Europe. The scholarship 
tolerated within the USSR had little appreciation for either of them, and Sovietologists in 
the West learned that catechism well. However, with the tensions arising in Yugoslavia 
after Tito’s death, the impact of Pope John Paul II, and the sheer weight of what has 
transpired throughout the region over the last couple of decades, the importance of both 
nation and religion as major foci for understanding developments within the region have 
come back – sometimes, with a vengeance – into undeniable prominence.  
In many ways, Ukraine had been a special case in that regard. Anyone familiar 
with its history could hardly ignore either the significant role played by Ukrainians’ 
desire over the last two centuries to have their own state or the impact religious 
communities had played in that desire. The spawning place of Ukrainian nationalistic 
longings had been Galicia, the westernmost region of Ukrainian settlement; a leading role 
in the development of those longings had been played by the Ukrainian Greek Catholic 
Church (UGCC) which had flourished there since the late seventeenth century. Galicia 
was at the time within the Austrian Empire, out of reach of the Russian tsarist empire, 
which gave but little room to independence-minded ideas on the part of “Little Russians” 
(the usual Russian designation for Ukrainians at the time). Even so, the large majority of 
Ukrainians adhered to the Orthodox church, rather than to the Uniate one. So, for 
Ukrainians who longed for an independent state, nation and religion were all tangled up – 
and have remained so to the present day.  
The book under review treats the history of the interrelationship between national 
yearnings and religious communities in Ukraine, from the Early Modern period to the 
present. The various chapters have all appeared elsewhere (the last in the volume from a 
1999 issue of Religion in Eastern Europe ), but the authors have revised and updated 
them all; ten of the eleven chapters were written between 1990 and 2000. The book 
covers the major developments: while both the UGCC and Orthodoxy within Ukraine are 
considered, the authors note that the UGCC receives overall less attention in the articles 
included in this book than that church’s role deserves; they do not specifically note, 
though, that the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) receives a great 
deal of treatment in the volume.  
RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE XXIII, 6 (December 2003) page 56. 
 
 
The two authors are well-known Ukrainian emigré scholars: Serhii Plokhy is 
director of the Church Studies Program at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies 
(CIUS), and Frank E. Sysyn is director of the Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical 
Research at the same institute. CIUS has long been a faithful disseminator of information 
about Ukraine and a vigorous voice for Ukrainian independence. With this volume, CIUS 
continues to meet its typically high standards of careful scholarship and unabashed 
support for Ukrainian distinctiveness. The volume makes for interesting and informative 
reading.  
Ukrainian Christianity is an undeniably major player in Christendom, whether it 
has been allowed full opportunity by its erstwhile religious leaders to show that or not. 
Prior to its forced incorporation into the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) after World W 
ar II, the UGCC was the largest of the Eastern Christian churches in union with Rome. It 
reemerged only in the waning days of the Soviet Union, as Ukraine lurched toward 
independence. While a large number of formerly UGCC parishes have remained within 
the Orthodox communion, over 3000 parishes have identified with the UGCC, re-
established in 1990 – allowing it to retain its status as the largest Uniate church. As well, 
the nation of Ukraine has more than 13,000 Orthodox parishes – a number greater than 
that in the whole of the Russian Federation. Even with the three-way split of Orthodoxy 
within Ukraine since 1991 – into the U krainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate 
[UOC-MP]), the UAOC, and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kiev Patriarchate [UOC-
KP]) – the Moscow patriarchate has nearly as many congregations in Ukraine as in 
Russia. Ukraine has long boasted the most faithful of the East Slavic Orthodox faithful in 
numbers of parishes, vocations, and religious; regrettably, in independent Ukraine those 
faithful parcelled out among three competing Orthodox communions.  
The volume under review deals with a variety of facets of the role played by these 
major Christian communions within Ukraine, including the restricted field of operations 
allowed to the UGCC by Roman hierarchical leadership in various countries and the 
impact of the Ukrainian emigré community in Canada on the UAOC re-established in 
1989. T his review cannot take the space to cover all the chapters; it may be hoped that 
comment on a few will entice readers to obtain the volume and read it for themselves.  
The authors pull no punches in exposing the ROC’s attempts to inhibit the 
development of a sense of Ukrainian distinctiveness, whether in state or in church. As 
well, the authors openly acknowledge the radical departures of the first existence of the 
UAOC from Orthodox canon law, 
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departures which raised enough suspicions within the worldwide Orthodox 
communion that it could not possibly hope to find acceptance; the authors are thus at 
pains to point out that in its second brief existence (during World War II) and in the post-
1989 situation, the UAOC has been careful to remain within canonical expectations. The 
authors deal forthrightly with questions about the legitimacy and implications of the late 
seventeenth century elimination of the Kievan metropolitanate via absorption by the 
Moscow patriarchate; given that background, the conflict between the UOC-MP and the 
UOCKP is, at least, easier to understand (if not necessarily to justify). Each of these 
topics is fleshed out in considerable detail, with abundant notation and exploration of 
significant implications.  
This volume has much to offer anyone interested in exploring the interrelationship 
of religion and nation, in general, and within Ukraine, in particular. This collection of 
articles comes together well to present a coherent whole – something frequently not 
accomplished in similar attempts. This book has much to commend it, and it is warmly 
recommended.  
James Payton, Professor at Redeemer University College (Ancaster, Ontario, Canada) 
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Mitja Velikonja, Religious Separation & Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina; 
translated from Slovenian by Rang’ichi Ng’inja. Eastern European Studies; no. 20. 
General Editor: Stjepan MetÓrovi. [sic; MeÓtrovi.]. College Station, Texas: Texas A&M 
University Press, 2003. pp. xiv + 365; includes endnotes, bibliography and index. - 
Reviewed by Gerald  
Shenk  
There are many books you wish you had written. There are some texts you wish 
others would read, so that they might better understand you and your experiences. There 
are also a few books you wish you could have read some 25 years earlier, the better to 
make sense of a complex situation in which you were living.  
This text by a young Slovenian sociologist is all of these, for me. It represents a 
careful and sober compilation of historical data on the role of the three primary religious 
traditions (Orthodox Christian, Catholic Christian, and Islamic) in what was Tito’s 
Yugoslavia and its aftermath. It is no small undertaking for a scholar to sift through the 
myriad competing claims about the data with understanding and critical evaluation. 
Velikonja accomplishes this and much more. He is close enough to speak with the 
confidence of an insider, yet sufficiently removed to sort the often florid rhetoric and 
place the contradictory claims into a useful comparative framework. As a Slovenian, he 
can and does take standpoints that are above the fray, so to speak.  
Velikonja’s account centers on Bosnia-Herzegovina, which means that it must 
intertwine the legacies of neighboring empires over many centuries. It also inevitably 
includes many specific developments in next-door (Yugoslav) republics of Serbia and 
Croatia. Going far beyond the merely descriptive rehearsal of primary recent trends, his 
approach is interpretive and explanatory, keying in to some of the deepest puzzles that 
stymied outside journalists, military strategists and scholars alike during the eruptions of 
the 1990s.  
In order to untangle religious interactions and cultural or political intolerance at 
the heart of the Balkans, this research carefully explicates the strands that our 
contemporaries in the region have inherited from centuries of complex exchanges among 
such empires as the Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman and H absburg. Bosnia’s 
historical fate closely mirrors the big games and petty moves of the Great Powers 
throughout most of the past two centuries. Waves of military conquests, border shifts, 
accommodation and compromise for the sake of survival have left an indelible imprint on 
each cultural group. 
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Velikonja’s account places an appropriate amount of emphasis on the unique 
profile and role of the medieval “Bosnian Church,” and on the extensive impact of the 
500-year Ottoman reign on all Bosnia’s religious communities (Pax Ottomanica, Chapter 
3). The Turks’ millet system of administering subject populations for civil purposes 
through their religious structures is especially important for an understanding of the 
linkage between religious and national identity in the Balkans. It meant, for all practical 
purposes, that ideas of citizenship and political agency had to emerge through a thick 
layer of religious identity, heavily filtered through the mediation of officials who bore 
primarily a religious responsibility for the well-being of their “flock.” Compromise and 
adjustments for the sake of preserving religious institutions understandably took 
precedence for many generations over the more mundane tasks of fleshing out national 
and cultural autonomy.  
Five centuries of Ottoman management in Bosnia made religion politically 
important. As Velikonja puts it, “One result of the millet system was that religion became 
the main identifying factor for the individual ethnic groups” (122). For this reason, the 
primary intellectual forces came from religious circles, and until the Austro-Hungarian 
invasion and occupation (1878 and following), Bosnia’s constituent populations had 
effectively not yet been politicized into nationalist bodies.  
What the Habsburg management accomplished in the next four decades in Bosnia 
is crucial for understanding consequences throughout the rest of the 20
th 
century, 
according to Velikonja. W hile Bosnia had previously been quite isolated from many 
geopolitical processes in the wider European context, the Austro-Hungarian Empire set 
out to wrest it as quickly as possible into the world of modernization (electricity, trains, 
trams, major road systems, monumental architecture, museums, etc.).  
In a remarkable disclosure of the occupying forces’ mentality, the Austro-
Hungarian Finance Minister in 1895 gave an interview (to a London paper) that 
characterized the Empire’s mission “in the entirely mythical binary categories of 
transition from chaos to cosmos,” Velikonja observes. The official, who was a Hungarian 
historian and diplomat, viewed Bosnia-Herzegovina before the occupation as a “totally 
chaotic country engulfed in complete confusion, corruption, and anarchy. The new 
authorities would solve these problems, restore order, and ensure the equality of all 
religions” (120).  
However well-meant their invasion and occupation, however “enlightened” their 
cultural and political policies, the Empire’s interventions sparked such resistance and 
reactions (including those in neighboring Serbia and Croatia) that the toll may be traced 
directly down through to the far end of the 
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bloody 20
th 
century. Habsburg rule in four decades set off a politicization of each 
respective religious community, yielding a virulent new breed of confused clero-
nationalism:  
The more or less forcible transplantation of the religio-national ideological myths  
from the neighboring nations manifested a new dimension in the multinational and  
interreligious relations of what was a heterogeneous Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
These  
myths encouraged division, intolerance and usurpation from the start (122).  
The zealotry of the Catholic Habsburg monarchy included annexing Bosnia-
Herzegovina (October 1908), sparking reactions from newly awakening nationalist 
resistance by Serbs in Bosnia, and leading directly to waves of repression, collective 
punishments and outright state terror against undefended civilian populations. During 
World W ar I, which began with young Serbs assassinating Austria’s Crown Prince, 
Archduke Ferdinand in 1914, “the Austro-Hungarian authorities terrorized Serbian 
nationalists and the Serbian population through trials, massacres, internment, and 
ostracism. . . For the first time in their history, a significant number of Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s inhabitants were persecuted and liquidated because of their national 
affiliation. It was an ominous harbinger of things to come” (141).  
Velikonja concurs with another Balkanologist (S. P. Ramet) who notes that 
Bosnia’s Muslims also catch the spark of nationalism from their friction with the 
Habsburgs: it was “Austro-Hungarian occupation itself which more directly sparked a 
new consciousness” among them (130). Velikonja’s general conclusion: “the fateful 
differences between the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina emerged mainly as a consequence 
of external nationalist influences and existing internal religious distinctions” (134).  
From this point forward through the 20
th 
century, Velikonja’s chief contribution 
lies in explicating the art and artifice of each community’s survival strategy: 
mythmaking. Previous mythologies had been primarily religious, cultural and somewhat 
historical in nature. He summons considerable evidence to differentiate these late 
emergent ideological nationalisms in Bosnia from the religious and historical communal 
identities that preceded them.  
Such mythmaking skills are not unique to the heirs of Balkan realities, of course, 
but the elaborations he portrays (relying in part on the key work by Michael Sells, The 
Bridge Betrayed) sometimes reach fantastical proportions. Typical elements include the 
notion that [our] soil is sacred, [our] nation is chosen by God, all victims [on our side] are 
innocent, [our] warriors are heroic martyrs, automatically slated for sainthood, and the 
sufferings [of our side] are claimed to equate to the 
 
RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE XXIII, 6 (December 2003) page 61.  
sufferings of Christ. Particular stress is placed on the idea that anyone who is not 
with us is not only dangerous, wicked, etc., but a traitor to our faith, our race and our holy 
cause (since the opponent is by definition someone who originally should have belonged 
to our side).  
Vilification and demonization of the enemy reached new depths in the 20
th 
century, Velikonja observes. During the Serbian monarchy between World Wars I & II, 
“ecclesiastic organizations in the kingdom of Yugoslavia were conflict-ridden, 
undemocratic, and infused with religious intolerance and animosity. In addition, they had 
very strong nationalistic ties,” although individuals in Bosnia constituted a conspicuous 
exception, showing a “high level of mutual tolerance” across different religious 
backgrounds (160). With the potent and vicious brew of militant clericalism and political 
conservatism, Yugoslavia’s religious communities headed into the bloodletting of W orld 
War II armed with anti-Semitism, anti-communism, anti-liberalism, anti-masonry and 
pro-fascist proclamations by hierarchs both Orthodox and Catholic (161).  
After a careful review of policies on religion in Tito’s Yugoslavia, Velikonja 
moves to the penultimate chapter, which could almost stand alone as an explanation of 
the “W ar over Differences: the Religious Dimensions of Conflict in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, 1992-95.” How Croatia and Serbia (Presidents Tudjman and MiloÓevi.) 
conspired to carve up Bosnia; how the West’s failure to intervene and feeble ineffective 
gestures of rebuke made matters much worse; how intellectuals, journalists and cultural 
workers on all sides fell to the lowest levels of “profane political agitation” directed 
against their enemies; and how warlords using religious language and symbolism 
manipulated the media with xenophobia and apocalyptic fear of all other entities—all of 
these dimensions are examined and found culpable for the moral and spiritual bankruptcy 
which devastated every one of Bosnia’s religious communities during the most recent 
war.  
In many ways the religious organizations had been weakened throughout 
communist rule in Tito’s Yugoslavia; the new nationalist states emerging from the break-
up of that order were also quite insecure. Religious legitimation was required if the new 
regimes were to secure the consent and collaboration of their constituent populations. 
Velikonja calls this process “the frail attempts at re-Christianizing and religio-national 
integration in post-Socialist countries.” Never before had B osnia’s inhabitants, he 
reasserts, been “subjected to such systematic persecution, mass slaughter, dispossession, 
and forceful proselytizing. Never before had they been forced to seek refuge from the 
destructive logic of religio-national exclusivity outside their own borders in such vast 
numbers” (288). When weak new 
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states use poisonous nationalist ideologies in nostalgic ploys to offer weak old 
religious bodies a shortcut back to a share of power from ancient times, the combination 
is literally deadly. The religions of Bosnia had long been tolerant, Velikonja reminds us; 
it was not until recent centuries of “Ottoman weakness and Western aggression that both 
Muslims and Christians became fanatical and intolerant” there (289).  
If this treatise had been available a quarter century earlier, I would have brought 
many questions to it from my experiences living for two years in Sarajevo, Bosnia’s 
capital. Why does my Muslim neighbor immediately connect me with Prince Eugene of 
Savoy, while showing me the little wooden mosque he is so painstakingly refurbishing in 
his retirement? What does it mean when a Muslim friend greets me in December and 
inquires whether I celebrate Christmas, and if so, which date do I observe? (“In which 
case, congratulations on Christmas!”) Furthermore, why does the Catholic cathedral seem 
like a hub of bustling activities, while the two synagogues and the Serbian Orthodox 
monuments seem rather neglected? What were the indicators for a resurgence of Islam in 
the Balkans among the traditional Slavic Muslim population, and what sort of renewed 
Islam would it be? What were then fresh questions on Kosovo and the Medjugorje 
phenomena are covered in some detail as well.  
But the best reasons for reading this text deeply today have to do with new 
empires, new legitimations for violence on a global scale, and new crusades to exclude 
the “other” on religious and cultural grounds. Hegemons in Washington, London and 
around the world, together with their pious helpers offering religious blessing, should 
take serious warning from this account. And all of us should learn the hazards of “hate 
silence” (in addition to “hate speech”). It is the failure of moderates to reject, isolate and 
refute the fanatics on our own side that gives such license to hatred, fear and carnage in 
the name of God (293).  
Velikonja’s work is very well-documented, using primarily indigenous sources. 
He mostly neglects Protestant matters; minority affairs turn up in relation to a few 
passages noting Jewish history in the region. But the work is of substantial merit. I am 
glad to commend it to all readers of REE. Religious tolerance and real diversity cannot 
remain content at superficial levels, as if differences among us are insignificant. 
Comprehending and making positive room for the other, in all their reality, is essential if 
the whole world is not going to follow Bosnia into self-destruction.  
Gerald Shenk, Eastern Mennonite Seminary, Harrisonburg VA.  
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